Tackling the Liberal Shapeshifter

Liberalism as the Air that We Breathe

Scholars have struggled to define liberalism. Historians have surprised to find that the concept “liberalism” began much later than anticipated. Locke didn’t know what liberalism was. “Liberalism” began its life as a political concept beginning of the 19th century in Spain, of all places. The word “liberalism” has a varied history. The repetition of the word arose contingently in response to other political movements in different countries at different times.

Yes, the scholarship has surprised me too.

Liberalism is a strange beast. Who would have thought that liberals would argue for censorship? Who could have predicted that a purportedly “right wing” United States Vice President would have to exhort liberal Europe to free speech? Who could have predicted that such a speech would strike terror in the European and American “liberal elite”?

Liberalism is a shapeshifter.

If “liberalism” constantly re-creates itself to respond to the contingencies of history, what exactly is “the postliberal common good tradition” “post” to?

I wonder. No doubt that common good constitutionalism matters. It is “post” to legal positivism. The integrity, depth, and legal expertise of Adrian Vermeule’s legal research program has granted him access behind enemy lines. Such visibility has also provoked liberal reactionary ad hominem hostility and tiresome liberal bullying. Denial remains the best friend of amnesia.

I remain astounded at the ignorance promoted by the mainstream academy, media, and professional managerial class.

Common Good Postliberals must fight and win such practical professional battles. Formation of a new class of common good politicians can help too.

Nonetheless . . . .

I wonder if postliberals could win such battles and lose the war, so to speak. Liberalism with its faux universalism helps their virtue-signaling. Human beings, however, don’t live “universal” lives. We are participatory social and political animals. We have histories, families, local environments that remain with us positively and negatively. Southern Californians think that they are cosmopolitan, but they really have just participated in Southern Californians culture. “Cosmopolitanism” is just as particular and local as was my early life in the Ohioan village where my family had lived for nearly 200 years.

Perhaps I’ve chased contemporary liberalism up the wrong tree. If political liberalism can re-create itself at will, perhaps liberalism’s political viability does not create its cultural viability. Perhaps it’s cultural presence creates its political viability.

Alexandre Lefebvre has argued this in an insightful book, Liberalism as a Way of Life (LWL hereafter). Sure, Lefebvre thinks that liberalism provides an admirable life style (admirable is about as good as liberalism can get). He writes, after all, to promote liberalism.

Lefebvre thinks that John Rawls is the bomb, an intellectual giant.

Lefebvre argues that liberalism is the air that we breathe. We are fish swimming in a liberal fishbowl. Liberalism provides the “values” by which we all, he argues, live our lives. And Lefebvre looked at liberalism and saw that it was not good, but “rewarding and sufficient”:

“liberalism can be the basis for a personal worldview, way of living, and spiritual orientation. You don’t need to be liberal plus something else, such as Christian, Buddhist, utilitarian, or hedonist. It is possible, and I contend, rewarding and sufficient, to be liberal through and through” (LWL, pp. 16-17).

“To be liberal through and through” can be “rewarding and sufficient,” even a “spiritual orientation.”

I guess that’s as good as we can hope, given the liberal denial of a substantive Good.

Here’s my big idea for the week: Liberalism gains its political and legal strength from its pervasive cultural presence.

The media, educational apparatus, and the professional managerial class provides the propaganda to sustain liberalism amid its contradictions and falsity. Liberalism has stolen our language (OMG!), practices, and narratives by which we live our lives. It parasitically sucks the bodily fluids out of other traditions . It then leaves them shriveled and then casts them aside as empty shells.

I. Lefebrve admits that liberalism is a moral project, an assertion of a particular understanding of the good for human beings.

Liberalism cannot shake the moral contents of its origin in the Christian virtue of “liberal” das in gracious, generous. Of course the different virtues ultimately take their place as virtues by their participation in the Good. Lefebvre can’t help himself. Hed invoke the goodd, even as he limits it:

“the values and attitudes enshrined in liberal social and political institutions, and everywhere present in the public and background culture of liberal democracies, can and often do inform a much more general sensibility—one supple enough to be realized differently and appropriately in all aspects of life. The good life, for such people, is the liberal life” (LWL, p. 17)

Note the tendentious limitation on “the good life” — it is only “for such people.” Lefebvre both affirms and then denies that human lives participate in a transcendent Good. He denies the purported “moral neutralism” of contemporary liberalism. It has snake oil to try to peddle, every bit as much the character trope in post-WWII movies:

Any good that is merely good “for such people” that does not participate in the Good isn’t any good at all!

Lefebvre deepens the contradiction:

“My argument is also normative in that I propose that liberalism is a good way of life. I’m not suggesting that it is better than other ways of life. Any self-respecting liberal would by doctrine and disposition shrink from such a claim. But I have no qualms asserting that a liberal way of life has its own perks and felicities. This is why a key purpose of my book is to demonstrate how a liberal way of life has rewards for those who commit to it, as distinct from its wider effects on our societies, or the advancement of democracy and social justice. Being liberal is an intrinsically fulfilling, generous, and fun way to be” (p. 18).

Here is a brash, bold, embracing of “emotivism.” Good = fulfilling, generous, and a fun way to be!

Just like Hannibal Lecter!

The Good emptied of its good. And of its body fluids.

If it feels good, do it!

One can notice here the rot at the core of contemporary liberalism: It everywhere promotes itself as good at the same time that it must deny the whole concept of “the good.” Perhaps that is why Hannibal Lector is the epitome of terror. He is just living out his own good that is intrinsically fulfilling, generous, and fun way to be in his own way.

You do you!

II. Lefebvre embraces this politics of the non-good good (or is it a good non-good?).

Lefebvre resorts to the denizen of liberal political theory par excellence, John Rawls. Lefebvre promotes three Rawlsian characteristics of the liberal order:

(1) “First, it means that the social order is not fixed or beyond human judgment but instead designed and maintained for the mutual benefit of all of its members” (LWL, pp. 28-29).

(Psst. Don’t ask who defines “mutual benefit” or what it means without a concept of participating in the Good. He might think that you are rude. Rudeness is a profound vice in liberalism.)

(2) “Second, it means that society is not held together by a common good or shared end. . . Its only shared end is, so to speak, ironic: to maintain itself as a fair system of cooperation so that members can pursue, within reasonable limits, their own conceptions of the good life” (LWL, p. 29)

(Is a personal concept of the good life really a concept of a life that participates in the Good? When is irony irony and not flat out contradiction? And by the way, by “cooperation” he really means “competition.”)

(3) “Third, it means that reciprocity moves to the center of the social bond. Members of such a society tend to see one another and themselves as self-interested and other regarding, rational and reasonable, and seek their own advantage and honor fair terms of cooperation” (LWL, p. 29).

(Okay, seek your own advantage as much as possible. Now, without contradiction, embrace fair terms of cooperation. Then ask, what does “the social bond” entail?)

One has to give Lefebvre credit. He tries to make bricks by denying himself straw:

“The kind of perspective I advance on liberalism is more typically called a conception of the good. Rawls himself gave that latter term its authoritative definition as “an ordered family of final ends and aims which specifies a person’s conception of what is of value in human life, or alternatively, of what is regarded as a fully worthwhile life.” I’m happy for my argument to be classified under this heading. Still, I worry that this phrase sounds all too cerebral” (LWL, pp. 31-32).

Too cerebral? Really? Not intellectually contradictory? Not logically self-defeating? I can describe this “concept of the good” as a lot of things. But such an account does not embrace good thought or a “concept of the good” any more the Hannibal Lecter represents a virtuous member of the forensic psychiatric guild.

Lefebvre presents a liberalism of the good that denies the common and eternal Good. What he gives with one hand, he takes away with the other. It’s like locking yourself inside the house in order to find the key to the house under the welcome mat outside.

Lefebvre can ignore the contradiction only because liberalism remains the air in which we breathe.

Now say these two things right next to each other:

“society is not held together by a common good or shared end”

“‘Liberals always saw themselves as fighting for the common good and continued to see this common good in moral terms”

A = non-A

III. Lefebvre nonetheless effectively describes how liberalism, with all its contradictions, permeates Northern Atlantic, and especially American, culture.

Lefebvre calls it “liberal sensitivities.” “Sensitivities” are ways that have “become invisible by infiltrating everything” (LWL, p. 86). If Lefebvre was a non-liberal, liberals could call him a “conspiracy hypothesis person.”

First, he notes a shift in the nature of swear words. I’ve never sworn much. My pietistic background inhibited it; I had a cross-country coach who defined swearing as “The attempt of a weak mind to express oneself forcefully.” Nonetheless, I laughed at George Carlin’s routine about the seven words one could not say on TV.

Lefebvre notes that swearing has changed in the last decade. I can attest to this from the work room floor. Old words, usually pertaining to body fluids or sexual activities or to divine imprecation no longer shock or even raise a eyebrow. Contemporary liberalism now censures a different set of words language one can and cannot use. One cannot use “words that essentialize and convey contempt for subgroups of people, whether in terms of race . . . , mental acuity . . . , physical disability . . ., sexual orientation . . . , gender , and age” (LWL, p. 89). Such words bear the same, if not more taboo as before, but now liberals enforce the taboo because “such terms come to be internalized and devastate one’s sense of self-worth” (LWL, p. 89).

The old “self-esteem metric” just won’t go away.

Of course, one can say, “old white guy” without sanction. We, after all, need named as oppressors who steal opportunity through the oppression of others. Nonetheless, Lefebrve’s observation is right on. And I just don’t want to poke that beast anymore.

And yes, I did earn a trip to the Provost’s office once for reading from Harry Frankfort’s On Bullshit (Princeton, 2005) in a class. I still think that Frankfort has written a classic in linguistic analysis. Just don’t name it.

Second, Lefebvre mentions cruelty. “hatred of cruelty, understood as the infliction of pain on the weak by the strong for the purpose of fear and intimidation” (LCW, p. 92). Of course, one doesn’t have to breathe in liberalism to despise cruelty. And liberalism allows passive aggressive cruelty. Contemporary liberalism defines cruelty very specifically. Liberals name cruelty as whatever “destroys freedom and unseats judgment, which is especially intolerable for liberals, who value agency and self-determination so highly” (LWL, p. 92).

Subjecting children to state-funded genital-mutilation is kind; forcefully restraining such acts is cruel.

And up is down and down is up.

Lefebvre goes one step deeper. He notes that liberalism has presupposes “the horizontalization of morality. Sin, which offends a Being on a different (vertical) plane of existence, diminishes in importance; what starts to really matter are temporal (horizontal, or “mundane,” in the sense of worldly) interpersonal harms.” (LWL, p. 92). Liberalism metaphysically excludes transcendence in order to prevent metaphysical exclusions.

I dare you to say that without self-contradiction. Double dare you.

“When morality sheds (or just plain forgets) its vertical dimension, being a good person comes to mean not harming others. Being a great person person means doing nice things for them as well. That’s all there is to it: a radically horizontal vision of good, evil, moral relationship, virtue, decency, depravity, excellence, and flourishing” (LWL, p. 95)

The moral virtue of amnesia! Don’t worry! Just plain forget! And be nice doing it!

Cultural liberalism thus creates a private sphere and then relegates the Good into it. “Religious and metaphysical questions are not encoded into a liberal political conception, or the background culture it inspires. The source of a liberal way of life, in other words, passes over such questions in silence” (LWL, p. 98). And by “passes over such questions in silence,” he means “exclude and censor from rational discussion.” Liberalism has come to enforce a cultural anti-metaphysical metaphysics.

It’s all just “one nice thing after another.” And then you die.

Lefebvre notes that liberals do not always act or think like liberals. Liberal institutions and societies themselves can exhibit non-liberal “pathologies.” One has a compromised “liberaldom” just like Kierkegaard noted a compromised “Christendom.”

Lefebvre presents his “cultural liberalism” in a way that I recognize it. While he doesn’t provide precise definitions, he provides a sufficiently thick description for the liberal “water” that I must swim within when I step out of my dwelling in Southern California. Contemporary liberalism reigns through the monopoly that it exercises in media, the academy, and professional managerial class.

If we want to define the liberalism of which we are “post,” perhaps viewing it a hegemonic system of elite-cultural production might help.

IV. Conclusion

Cultures, like traditions, cannot close themselves off from the disputes that have formed them and the questions about the goods that they produce. Perhaps liberalism’s ability to shapeshift represents its ability to function as a tradition.

Pointing out Lefebvre’s fundamental contradictions about the Good will not change his life. He has staked much in writing his book — and perhaps received adequate reward for it. I don’t expect him to wake up in a crisis event, throw away his liberal way of life, and embrace the Good that is the Triune God. He doesn’t desire to become a saint, only a liberal “through and through.”

Afterall, liberalism as a way of life has its perks and felicities. For him. And “such people.”

Just don’t talk to those who struggle in the de-industrialized “fly-over” region or die deaths of despair or a young family trying to make ends meet by working multiple jobs while caring for their children.

I want to conclude with two observations from Lefebvre’s book that pertain to common good postliberalism:

(1) We cannot overestimate how liberalism has inserted its tentacles into our life, thoughts, and institutions.

Every time we utter the word, “value,” we have lost a bit of the battle. Every time we place voluntary relationships as more determinative than involuntary relationships, we contradict ourselves. To quote Pogo, “We have met the enemy and he is us.”

For those within the Abrahamic traditions, we have a confession of sin as central for a reason. For those outside this tradition in its multiplicity, one needs a Socractic elenchus in order to purge ourself of the liberalism that has seeped into us through our pores.

(2) Common good postliberalism requires an immense intellectual and elite effort to cure the amnesia that has rendered liberalism as “natural.”

Fortunately, humans find it hard, even unnatural, to live life as a liberal despite Lefebrve’s “fun.” Positivist law minus justice leaves jurisprudence wanting. Humans cannot live without using such comparatives as “better” and “best” — and thus implying the Good, as Iris Murdoch argued. Without participation in what is good, education becomes reduced to rubrics meant for the assessment of the educators — done for the sake of the educational managers and bureaucracy. Such an approach drains learning of the passion of love, a quest for the unity of the Good, True, and Beautiful. The vice of curiositas reigns; the virtue of studiositas wanes.

And education, particularly elementary and secondary education, matters, really, really matters.

Common good postliberalism requires cultural renewal. Winning a few elections will not do the necessary work. We can see the contradictions of liberalism through empirical observation as much as through logic. We will have to build without abundant material resources. Remember that liberal culture has had a monopoly on the entertainment industry, the mainstream media, and vast national and international governmental funding.

Liberal conservativism merely slowed down progressivist change. Common good postliberalism needs to change the terms of the discourse.

We have what is Good, True, and Beautiful on our side.

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Next week I want to extend Lefebvre’s analysis of liberalism’s use of popular culture. I will provide my narrative definition of contemporary liberalism and the politics, language, and practices that it generates as the politics, and language, and practices generate the narrative.